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Abstract: In Bergsonism, we come to a halt when it comes to communication be-
cause it involves static immobile elements such as concepts and words, which, for 
Bergson, make it impossible to gain an adequate understanding of each other’s na-
ture. Peirce offers an epistemological model, where the immobility of a linguistic 
sign is dissolved in semiosis.  Peirce’s concept of interpretant, reflecting the dynam-
ic relation of the subject, object and the sign that is being interpreted, offers a model 
of cognition that is based on the dynamism of meaning making, which provides a 
foundation for communication as a meaning making process, a case of duration in its 
own right. 
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*** 
Au-delà de la signification: l'interprétant de Peirce comme condition méta-
sémiotique de la communication 
 
Résumé: En examinant la philosophie de Bergson, nous éprouvons des difficultés à 
trouver une fondation théorétique pour une communication réussie. Selon Bergson 
la communication comporte des éléments immobiles, les concepts et les mots, qui 
rendent impossible la compréhension adéquate de la nature humaine d’autrui. Peirce 
propose un modèle épistémologique permettant de dissolver l'immobilité d'un signe 
linguistique dans la sémiose. La théorie de l'interprétant de Peirce prend en compte 
la relation dynamique du sujet, de l'objet et du signe interprété. Elle implique un 
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modèle cognitif basé sur le dynamisme de la formation de la signification. C’est ce 
modèle qui fournit une base pour la communication considérée comme processus de 
la formation de la signification et qui peut être vu comme un type de la durée berg-
sonienne. 
 
Mots-clés: Peirce, Bergson, interpretant, sémiose, communication
 
*** 
1. Foreword: from Bergson’s duration to Peirce’s semiosis     
Bergson made a major contribution to philosophy by highlighting the role of 
temporality in ontological and epistemological processes, opposing duration and 
intuition to static symbolic constructs such as concepts which crystallise, distort and 
misrepresent real being.  However, Fell notes that Bergson’s theory brings us to a 
halt when it comes to explaining metaphysical foundations for successful communi-
cation.  We can communicate our thoughts and feelings only if we crystallise them 
in linguistic constructs, but by doing so we distort and misrepresent the essence of 
what we want to communicate.   
Peirce’s notion of interpretant may offer a possibility of reconciling our need for 
static linguistic constructs with the dynamism of reality represented by these con-
structs.  By introducing the term “interpretant” Peirce singles out the dynamic ele-
ment in the relations between the sign and the person who perceives it. He thus of-
fers a foundation for lessening the opposition between the complexity and dyna-
mism of phenomena on the one hand and the apparent simplicity and inertness of a 
sign on another: as Eco claims, a sign can only be understood in the process of it 
being interpreted in communication.  Thus a sign (a static linguistic construct) can 
exist as such only in the dynamism of interpretation.   
As for the metaphysical predisposition for successful communication in general, 
the former can be constructed via Lukianova’s reading of Peirce’s Sign Theory, or 
Semiotic. Exploring the notion of interpretant further, she focuses on the following 
aspect of the term “interpretant”, namely the disposition or readiness of the perceiver 
to respond to a sign.   
Following Eco, Lukianova extends Peirce’s notion of interpretant beyond con-
siderations of meaning associated with concrete communication situations.   For 
Lukianova, the interpretant is a meta-semiotic construct, which conditions intra-
cultural communication inasmuch as it carries the communication potential for cul-
tural narratives which in turn underlie effective intra-cultural communication.  
By bringing dynamics into the heart of the process of signification Lukianova, 
following Peirce and Eco, makes further steps towards dissolving the immobility of 
a sign and restoring the dynamism of communication.  According to Lukianova, an 
interpretant should be considered not only as a category of semantics but as a central 
category of semiotics, which includes syntactics and pragmatics. 
    ESSACHESS. Journal for Communication Studies, vol. 8, no. 1(15) / 2015       153 
Rather than continuing with the analysis of a sign and its relation to the perceiver 
as Peirce does, Lukianova focuses on semiosis as a process of the development of a 
sign in communication.  She notes that Peirce’s semiotics is founded on the notion 
of a sign, but its main object of enquiry is not a sign and its nature but semiosis as 
the process of the evolution of the sign in communication.  Thus semiosis can be 
understood as the process of constructing meaning which involves the correlation of 
an object and its representation.  This process is based on the fact that the perceiver 
is familiar with the represented object that can be imagined and can appear as a 
mental representation of something, an idea that has an imagined material outline.   
The formation of this idea is a creative process (as proposed by Bergson), the pro-
cess that involves constructing semiotic reality using signs taken in their dynamic 
relation to the interpreter.  
Accepting the idea that the functionality and realisation of a communicated sign, 
despite its apparent static appearance, is actualized in a creative process, Fell sug-
gests that successful communication is metaphysically possible within the frame-
work of Bergson’s theory of duration and intuition provided we accept that what we 
are able to achieve in successful communication is not a replica of one’s mental 
processes in another person’s mind but a new understanding of reality that is con-
structed in the incessant flow of ontological and epistemological creation. 
 
2. Bergson: the dynamism of conscious processes  
In his theory of lived time—duration—Bergson effectively highlights the dyna-
mism of conscious processes, whereby human consciousness is presented as essen-
tially temporal, involving processes rather than static components.    In Bergson’s 
terms, conscious processes, the life of consciousness can be described as hetero-
geneous duration, with the term “duration” reflecting the temporality of mental 
states and “heterogeneous” meaning that the multiplicity of thoughts and feelings is 
a multiplicity of a special kind. Heterogeneity is a non-numerical multiplicity whose 
parts cannot be singled out spatially (whether in reality or in imagination) and ana-
lysed as separate units. However, the heterogeneity of conscious life consists of 
elements that can be individualised, so that they retain their distinctive identity but 
are fused with other elements.   
Bergson often uses a musical piece to illustrate heterogeneity.  A note’s musical 
meaning is determined by its position in the musical sequence and it’s relation with 
the rest of the notes which have no clear internal boundaries and flow into one ano-
ther whilst music is played.  Extracting a note from the continuity of sounds that 
makes the melody and is playing it in isolation, or playing the notes in a different 
order would destroy the melody but it would also destroy the musical identity of the 
notes severing the multiple connections between them.    
Speaking in the Bergsonian terms, human consciousness is structured in the 
same way as a musical piece.  However, there is a problem with the way we normal-
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ly understand states of consciousness, and this problem is reflected in our common 
use of the terms “more” and “less” in relation to the intensity of our emotions.  
“More” and “less” are spatial terms, so they imply spatial relations between states of 
consciousness that we may be referring to: something that is “more” is greater in 
magnitude than something that is “less”, so what is “more” can be regarded as a 
container for “what is less”. Bergson maintains therefore that what we mistakenly 
take to be a change in magnitude in a sensation or a feeling really is a change in 
quality. When we think that we experience the same feelings that differ in intensity, 
we in fact experience different feelings altogether: the life of consciousness entails 
qualitative, not quantitative changes, as stated in Chapter 1 of Bergson’s Time and 
Free Will  (Bergson, 1910, p. 1 –74).    
Bergson refutes the idea that the self endures through time preserving itself as 
some stable, nodal structure. The dynamic self is time as it seizes conscious pro-
cesses as they are and integrate them into its own being. To summarise,  
Psychological duration is not a succession of clearly defined and mutually exter-
nal units but a heterogeneous continuity of qualitatively diverse successive phas-
es ontologically bound with one another. There is no distinction between the du-
ration itself and its content, and processes that constitute duration constitute em-
bodied time in their ceaseless emergence (Fell, 2009, p. 15). 
 
3. Apprehending one’s own self in intuition   
Dispensing with the habitual view of a stable selfhood and replacing it with a 
model of an ever changing, evolving self, Bergson reviews our perception of epis-
temological processes and divides them into the perception of the outside features of 
an object and the perception of an object originating from within.     
Due to the practical rationality of everyday life we access the world, other people 
and our own selfhood from the outside and divide the world up mentally into static 
fragments that are easily comprehensible and stable.  These fragments are then rear-
ranged again and we gain a compete picture which we need for being able to orien-
tate ourselves in the world and act upon it.  This also gives us our habitual unders-
tanding of the self and conscious states as materialized and set out in space. The 
space here is a homogeneous space which contains our explicit recognition of things, 
people, their relative positions, as well as the relation between our own conscious 
states, as laid out simultaneously in a medium that unites them all.  
However, this conception of the world, people and one’s own self as aspects of a 
homogenized space, albeit practically useful, is a simplified, one-sided, and there-
fore distorted representation of reality.  What matters here for Bergson is that when 
we communicate with other people at this level, we do not address them as they 
really are but as they appear, their selves edited and reworked in our rational analyti-
cal interpretation. The real people that we deal with and talk to remain out of our 
reach.  
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The solution is seems to be offered in the alternative mode of conceiving the 
world, other people and the self by accessing them epistemologically from within. 
This way of conceiving reality involves grasping reality as a durational process that 
consists of a multiplicity of states that do not exist in separation but permeate one 
another.  
We are able to access the duration of our own selfhood in this way, and unders-
tanding what is involved in this should provide an entry point for accessing other 
selves in a similar way.  For Bergson, we can access the duration of our own cons-
cious processes by diverting our attention away from spatial pointers that we use for 
orientation in the outside space.  Distracted from this practical orienteering, we 
abandon externality with its prescribed clarity and, drifting away from it, intuit our 
own undefined and unhindered thoughts and feelings from within, becoming ac-
quainted with the original, unedited content of our psyche.  
This primary experiencing of the self is highly valued in Bergsonism because it 
gives one the view of his or her genuine self.   This happens in dreams, in inattentive 
perception of sounds and in other situations where the self is relaxed and detached 
from the external world insofar as it does not coordinate its fleeting elements with 
reference points in the external world, at the pre-reflective stage of consciousness.   
In intuition, the self is experienced as heterogeneous in composition—inasmuch 
as it involves different feelings, memories and perceptions—but is felt, without these 
differences being explicitly noted, as a continuous flux of interconnected processes. 
At the heart of this intuition is an awareness that “[t]here is a succession of states, 
each of which announces that which follows and contains that which precedes it” 
and that “[n]o one of them begins or ends, but all extend into each other” (Bergson, 
1999, p. 25).  
Intuiting ourselves in these terms involves letting our consciousness fix its atten-
tion on the immediate experience whereby we do not try to name our current state or 
reflect on the past, however immediate, and without anticipating the future, however 
proximate.  Our conscious awareness then temporally coincides with the actual 
being of our psyche and follows emotions and sensations as they unfold. For Berg-
son, this is the only way we could access duration, which “can be presented to us 
directly in an intuition” and “can never … be enclosed in a conceptual representa-
tion” (Bergson, 1999, p. 30).  
It is not easy to counteract the usual way of dealing with our own self, but if we 
succeed, we are rewarded with the manifestation of our own uniqueness and exclu-
sivity. We gains a view of ourselves where we are not measured or judged against 
superimposed criteria and where our value as inimitable individuals is not betrayed 
by external standardisation.   
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4. Practical impossibility of understanding another person  
As seen from the previous discussion, the intuitive perception of one’s own self, 
which gives one the understanding of his or her real nature, is achievable in principle 
if not in everyday experience. It would naturally follow that successful communica-
tion with others should involve intuitive knowledge of other selves too, inasmuch as 
intuitive knowledge could help us achieve adequate perception of other people. Can 
Bergsonism offer a model of ultimate communication—an ontological bonding that 
we can perhaps find between family members or members of the same religious or 
ethnic groups?  And if we can arrive at such a model perhaps it can supply a prin-
ciple of inclusion that could be extended to wider groups of people dissolving cultu-
ral or religious boundaries? Disappointingly, however, Bergson’s model of intuition 
stands in the way of any successful communication rather than aiding it. 
The problem with the pre-reflective mode of the self’s existence, when it’s dura-
tion is unbound and evolves spontaneously, is that such a self, if it were not able to 
harness and define its sense of experience, would live an isolated life without in-
volvement in language or society (Bergson, 1910, p. 137 – 138). The function of 
language in its regular forms serves to divide up experience into manageable facts 
concerning both world and self, and relations between them. Whilst purely temporal, 
de-spatialised existence of duration would remain an inner occurrence that takes 
place in our inner conscious life, linguistically expressed facts about it belong to the 
external medium modelled as homogenized space. The clarity of this spatialization 
and externalization of the self is the necessary basis of communication between 
people.    
This has a difficult consequence, as far as a Bergsonist would be concerned, as 
by means of regular communicative practices we cannot know another individual in 
any kind of adequate, sufficient, and complete terms.  To intuit the subjective states 
of someone else (at the same level that one has intuitive knowledge of one’s own 
states) would mean knowing all of the other person’s psychic experiences, insofar as 
their individual character is dependent on their relation to the whole. Having a com-
plete intuitive knowledge of somebody would mean, in effect, being that somebody 
as it would necessarily involve living through all his or her experiences. 
Bergson’s theory of duration and intuition, then, leaves us with a disappointing 
result. Heterogeneous duration accounts for the complexity and continuity of psy-
chological reality, and intuition is a process in which duration is recognized for what 
it is. Whilst this might appear to hold out the possibility of an ultimate intimate bon-
ding in communication if it could be achieved, the problem is that, as we have just 
seen, intuiting someone else would involve a complete identification with that per-
son. If such an intuitive grasp of another mind were possible, it would involve a 
collapse of two individuals into one.  
It seems, then, that Bergson’s theory of duration and intuition, instead of offering 
a model of perfect communication contradicts the very idea of communication as a 
social phenomenon. People could have perfect relationships if they communicated at 
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the level of intuition, but in order to communicate at all, they must misrepresent 
their own and other people’s nature because communication requires conceptualiza-
tion.  
 
5. Peirce: the dynamics of meaning-making  
Bergson’s theory of duration and intuition, whilst illuminating the nature of hu-
man selfhood emphasising and explaining the specificity of the self’s dynamism, 
nevertheless leads us to a cul-de-sac as soon as we question its capability to accom-
modate human interactions.  Forced out of its boundaries set in Bergson’s key texts, 
the duration and intuition theory creates metaphysical obstacles in the way of allow-
ing a theoretical framework able of accommodating both the heterogeneous nature 
of uniquely structured selfhood and human hope for fulfilling communication, 
where people genuinely and happily engage with each other’s unedited character.     
The realisation that Bergsonism takes its followers to this dead-end can result in 
one of the two outcomes: we can either accept the metaphysical impossibility of 
genuine communication or question the validity of Bergson’s philosophy—and this 
would be the readers’ first reaction.  On the second thought, one would want to 
investigate the problem further by examining closely processes involved in linguistic 
interactions—notably, Bergson does not do any of that as his discussion of language 
does not progress beyond the claim that concepts crystallize and immobilise reality. 
Concepts, words are at the heart of the communication problem in Bergsonism: 
we need language and words to communicate but it is the words that distort our real 
thoughts and feelings, ultimately misrepresenting us to each other.  To progress in 
this investigation we need to examine the relation between words and what they 
signify to listeners or readers—the need to resolve the communication problem in 
Bergson thus leads us to semiotics inasmuch as semiotics deals with meaning-
making of signs and symbols.   
In semiotics, broadly speaking, we have a choice of two major directions of in-
vestigation indicated by Saussure and Peirce, and it is the latter’s theory of semiosis 
that we will draw on whilst investigating the issues of meaning acquisition in the 
context of communication. 
Saussure offers a two-part (dyadic) model of the sign, according to which, a sign 
is composed of a signifier and the signified (Saussure, [1916] 1983). He extensively 
analyses signification—the relationship between the signifier and the signified 
(Saussure, 1983, p. 67), but his analyses tend towards greater and greater abstraction 
of the analysed elements at the expense of neglecting the role of individuals that 
perceive signs and communicate with each other using signs.  Also, his methodolog-
ical model treats signs and the relations between them as static abstractions making 
it difficult to apply his methodology, which traditionally belongs to linguistics, to 
the study of communication.  
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Peirce, on the other hand, suggests a triadic model of a sign that takes into ac-
count the dynamism of the process of signification and the role of a perceiving sub-
ject.  In his theory, the form which the sign takes is reflected in the concept of the 
representamen; an object is the object to which the sign refers, and an interpretant is 
the sense made of the sign, which emerges in the dynamic engagement of the per-
ceiver with the sign that he or she comprehends.   The relationship between the rep-
resentamen, the object and the interpretant is dynamic; this relationship is character-
ised as semiosis understood as interaction between all three (Peirce, 1931-58, 
5.484). 
Peirce’s theory of semiosis, which accounts for dynamism in signification and 
the role of the perceiver, seems to be a convenient starting point for our investigating 
deeper layers and undercurrents of communication, whilst at the same time maintai-
ning the Bergsonian position which puts forth movement and change found in all 
processes of being including communication.      
Eco’s development of Peirce’s semiotics will be especially useful here. Eco em-
phasises Peirce’s interest in the dynamism of the functioning of signs and uses his 
ideas to investigate communicative processes. Eco notes that Peirce is predominately 
interested in the dynamics of the life of signs without considering their involvement 
in communication. As far as Eco is concerned, semiotics should consider all cultural 
phenomena as communication facts (Eco, 2004, p. 43-44) as he is almost ready to 
equate culture with communication. Eco expands Peirce’s usage of semiosis demon-
strating that semiosis is founded on social relations and cannot be abstracted from 
communicating individuals (Guillemette & Cossette, 2006), (Eco, 2004, p. 257).  
 
6. The role of an interpretant in semiosis 
An interpretant, one of the three interrelated parts of a sign, is the most distinc-
tive and innovative element of Peirce's theory.  By introducing the interpretant into 
semiosis Peirce makes it central to the content of the sign, to signification: a sign 
signifies only when it is being interpreted. The sign (as part of the tri-part Peircean 
sign) is the signifier, e.g an utterance or a written word; the object corresponds to 
whatever is signified and an interpretant refers to the degree of understanding that 
we have of the relation between the sign and the object. In one of his definitions of a 
sign Peirce refers to an interpretant as the effect that a sign has upon a person 
(Peirce, 1998, Vol. 2, p. 478).  
The interpretant primarily refers to the understanding of a relation between a 
sign and an object but it can also be understood as the development of the original 
sign which enhances our understanding of the object that the original sign signifies.  
According to Peirce, the sign determines an interpretant but this determination is not 
causal and is similar to the way the sign signifies its object. The sign determines an 
interpretant, for example, smoke (sign) determines an interpretant sign of fire (its 
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object) by using certain features that shape our understanding such as the physical 
connection between fire and smoke.  
According to Peirce, any instance of signification involves a sign-vehicle (some 
particular feature through which signs signify their objects), an object and interpre-
tant. The object places constraints on the sign that could signify it and limits the 
features that the sign can use for signification. Thus the sign signifies the object only 
through some of the object’s features and focusing our attention on some features of 
the object/sign relation.  
The dynamic nature of signification is reflected in Peirce’s early account of signs 
as infinity of signs that precede other signs and follows them.  In this account inter-
pretants are presented as further signs, and signs as interpretants of earlier signs.  A 
sign determines an interpretant, and interpretant is itself a sign, and this inevitably 
seems to lead to the concept of infinite semiosis. 
To illustrate this point, we can think of a chain of signs where interpretants are 
also signs that determine other interpretants, and where there is a first and a last sign.  
The last sign has no interpretant as it terminates the semiotic process.  If it did not 
terminate the semiotic process it would not be the final interpretant as it would be a 
sign that would generate another interpretant and the process would continue.  But 
establishing the final sign is problematic: in order to be a sign in the Peircean sense, 
it must determine an interpretant, so the final sign must determine an interpretant in 
order to be a sign, and if it determines an interpretant it cannot be final.  
Establishing a first sign is equally problematic. Any sign (in order to be a sign) 
must be an interpretant of a preceding sign but a first sign cannot be the interpretant 
of a previous sign because if it were, the preceding sign would be the first sign. 
Allowing a first sign which is not the interpretant of an earlier sign, or a last sign 
with no interpretant, would conceptually jeopardise the ontological status of signs in 
the semiotic process. 
This has an effect on all other links of the semiotic chain.  If the final sign does 
not generate an interpretant and fails to be a sign because of it, then it has also failed 
to be an interpretant, since a valid sign is supposed to act as the interpretant of the 
previous sign.  This means that the previous sign has failed to generate a valid inter-
pretant and fails to be a valid a sign, and so on, until the entire semiotic chain col-
lapses. So if we want to preserve the semiotic chain we should not consider this 
chain as finite, as having a definite beginning (first sign) and a definite end (last 
sign).  In order for the chain to be a valid semiotic chain of signs and interpretants, 
we must allow for an indefinite semiotic process whereby signs generate further 
signs ad infinitum. 
But what of the object that stands behind the semiotic process?  Peirce divides 
objects into two major groups: immediate objects and dynamic objects. The im-
mediate object is the object of the sign as we understand it at some given point in the 
semiotic process, and the dynamic object is the object of the sign as it stands at the 
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end of the semiotic process.  The immediate object corresponds to an interim un-
derstanding of the object, and the dynamic object is the object in its completeness, 
and the semiotic process tends towards our complete understanding of it.  
The dynamic object, the “object as it really is” (Ransdell, 1977, p. 169) is the 
original object that generates and drives the semiotic process. The purpose of semio-
sis is to reach a complete understanding of the dynamic object.  The immediate 
object is “what we, at any time, suppose the object to be” (Ransdell, 1977, p. 169), 
an incomplete, provisional representation of the dynamic object generated at an 
interim stage in a sign chain.  
Ransdell highlights the difference between the dynamic object and the im-
mediate object pointing out that  
[T]he immediate object may involve some erroneous interpretation and thus 
be to that extent falsely representative of the object as it really is, and, se-
cond, because it may fail to include something that is true of the real object 
(Ransdell, 1977, p. 169). 
The semiotic chain progresses towards the final stage of reaching out to the real 
object, and different interpretants are formed along the way. Peirce singles out three 
types of interpretants corresponding to three different ways in which we relate a sign 
to an object: the immediate interpretant, the dynamic interpretant and the final inter-
pretant: 
The [Dynamic] Interpretant is whatever interpretation any mind actually 
makes of a sign. […]The Final Interpretant does not consist in the way in 
which any mind does act but in the way in which every mind would act. 
That is, it consists in a truth which might be expressed in a conditional 
proposition of this type: “If so and so were to happen to any mind this sign 
would determine that mind to such and such conduct.” […] The Immediate 
Interpretant consists in the Quality of the Impression that a sign is fit to 
produce, not to any actual reaction (Peirce, 1958, Vol. 8. 315 (1909).  
Peirce’s three types of interpretants are linked to his three grades of clarity, or 
levels of understanding, introduced in his 1878 article, “How to Make Our Ideas 
Clear” (Peirce, 1982, Vol. 3, p. 257–275).   It is possible to understand the first 
grade of clarity as one’s having an unreflective grasp of a concept in everyday expe-
rience; the second grade of clarity, as corresponding to having a general definition of 
that concept or ability to provide such a definition. The third grade of clarity may 
correspond to our understanding of the practicality of the object as is clarified in 
Peirce's statement of the pragmatic maxim: 
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, 
we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of 
these effects is the whole of our conception of the object (Peirce, 1982, 
Vol. 3, p. 266).  
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Thus for Peirce, a complete understanding of a concept entails familiarity with it 
based on regular encounters with that concept, ability to have a general definition of 
it, and knowing what consequences one might expect from that concept’s effects on 
the world.   
These grades of clarity, pragmatically defined, merge with Peirce’s semiotic as 
he introduces three types of interpretants which correspond to these three grades of 
clarity whereby one’s readiness to use or interpret a sign is followed by logical anal-
ysis and pragmatic analysis associated with the final interpretant  (Peirce, 1958, Vol. 
8, 185 (1909). 
Thus for Peirce, the first grade of clarity corresponds to the immediate interpre-
tant, the second grade of clarity corresponds to the dynamic interpretant, and the 
third grade of clarity, to the final interpretant.  Lukianova reminds that the increasing 
clarity reflected in different interpretants, means for Peirce the evolution of the rela-
tionship between the interpreting subject and the interpreted object, from implicit 
familiarity with the object (immediate interpretant) via logical definition (dynamic 
interpretant) towards pragmatic clarification (final interpretant). 
The immediate interpretant, which Lukianova associates with the first grade of 
clarity, is a general schematic understanding of the sign/dynamic object relationship, 
an indistinct imagery corresponding to phenomena which the given sign could refer 
to.  It seems that the immediate interpretant corresponds to the schema of the sign 
extracted from its content, “all that is explicit in the sign apart from its context and 
circumstances of utterance” (Peirce, 1958, Vol. 5.473 (1907).  Atkin notes that the 
immediate interpretant is marked by lack of analysis and critical reflection on the 
object, which comes later in the process of semiosis.  Our recognition of grammati-
cal relations between words and sentences could be an example of an immediate 
interpretant, if sentences are taken as signs (Atkin, 2013).   
The interpretation of a sign corresponding to the dynamic interpretant gives an 
incomplete understanding of the dynamic object. The immediate object of a sign in a 
sign chain consists of previously made interpretations. The dynamic interpretant, 
along with previous dynamic interpretants, constitutes the immediate object and 
corresponds to our partial understanding of the dynamic object.   
The final interpretant corresponds to a complete and true understanding of the 
dynamic object, potentially reachable at the end of enquiry and shared by those who 
took part in the enquiry (Hookway, 1985, p. 139). Ransdell shows that in the case of 
the final interpretant, the dynamic object and the immediate object coincide (Rans-
dell, 1977, p. 169–170). 
 
7. Peirce and Bergson: connection points 
An unsympathetic critic could say that the Peircean theory is unlikely to provide 
a solution for a problem arising in Bergsonism without both theories clashing and 
162    Natalia LUKIANOVA, Elena FELL                                   Beyond meaning … 
without either of them undermining each other.  Take, for example Peirce’s denial of 
intuition as “a cognition not determined by a previous cognition of the same object” 
(Peirce, 1982, Vol 2, p. 193), which directly contradicts Bergson’s treatment of 
intuition as the only way of an adequate familiarity with the object.  Also, the gene-
ral pragmatic orientation of Peirce’s epistemology clashes with Bergson’s preference 
for disinterested knowledge which accesses the object as it is, rather than selecting 
its practically useful features.  Indeed, combining Peirce’s theory of semiosis with 
Bergson’s theory of duration and intuition may not seem possible even though 
Peirce extensively explores the dynamic nature of semiosis. 
However, both Peirce’s and Bergson’s epistemologies investigate the same is-
sue—cognition—albeit considering it from different angles and using different terms 
and approaches.  The dynamism of semiosis (Peirce) does not contradict Bergson’s 
principle claim that duration permeates all being and all processes because they also 
include the process of meaning making—semiosis.  Bergson examines perception at 
length in Matter and Memory (Bergson, 1991) but his analysis of getting to know 
something by analysis or intuition (Introduction to Metaphysics, (Bergson, 1999), 
Time and Free Will (Bergson, 1910) is not so detailed.  He states that in analysis, we 
dismantle and then reconstruct the object of enquiry, whilst in intuition we grasp its 
essence immediately.  Bergson does not offer a detailed analysis of linguistic inte-
ractions, and so Peirce’s account of meaning making in semiosis could be said to 
complement Bergson’s account of getting to know something rather than contradic-
ting it.  Moreover, we claim that Peirce can do more than merely complementing 
Bergson’s epistemology—it can restore duration as a valid feature of epistemology, 
something that Bergson fails to do as he fails to acknowledge analysis as a process 
and a case of duration. 
The reason why Bergson prefers intuition to analysis is because according to 
him, intuition provides the genuine knowledge of a process whereby someone kno-
wing an object coincides with that object’s being and also with the being of the 
knowing agent. Thus the epistemological model that Bergson accepts is ultimately a 
tri-part process consisting of three concurrent processes that coincide temporally, 
existentially and physically, so that they can be considered three sides of one and the 
same process, a tri-part identity of the same phenomenon.  These sides are (1) the 
being of the object, (2) the being of the subject, and (3) the knowledge that the sub-
ject has of the object.  Only unreflective modes of self-perception, such as dreams 
and daydreaming can accommodate the state of affairs where all three fully coincide 
and are concurrent.  This is not possible when we rationally reflect on our selfhood 
and is even less possible when we perceive other people and communicate with 
them.   
In this Bergson disregards the fact that analysis, rational perception, is also a 
process and as such is a creation of something new, a case of duration.  Rather than 
bringing his epistemology to the dead-end stating that conventional knowledge does 
not coincide with the object, Bergson could have proposed an epistemological pro-
cess that evolves as duration with its object being its source, its impetus that gene-
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rates knowledge as something new rather than accepting only the type of knowledge 
which duplicates the object and does not move away from it. In fact, Bergson here 
creates an obstacle in the way of knowledge acquisition inasmuch as knowledge 
acquisition is a process. 
Whist criticising analysis, Bergson becomes prejudiced against it to the point of 
ignoring that this process is continuous duration, like any other process, and that it 
can be considered as the process of creation. This can be done by liberating oneself 
from the view of analysis that Bergsonism creates, rather than rehearsing Bergson’s 
claim that analysis distorts the object of enquiry, and exploring the Peircean account 
of the meaning making process of semiosis which presents knowledge acquisition 
(or analysis in the Bergsonian terms) as duration and creative process—if we want to 
use Bergson’s terminology in order to indicate that despite of using different terms 
and different approaches, Bergson’s and Peirce’s discourses are not incompatible 
and can be engaged in a constructive dialogue. Other correlations between some 
Bergsonian and Peircean terms can demonstrate this mutual compatibility—see 
Table 1 below.  
The dynamic object can be said to correspond to Bergson’s duration, as both re-
fer to an object as it is and reflect the dynamic nature of reality.  The difference 
between duration and dynamic object mainly amounts to the difference in the phi-
losophers’ respective approaches to the real object:  whilst Bergson merges the on-
tology of the object with epistemology, whereby the being of duration is bound with 
its own awareness of itself in intuition, Peirce does not discuss the object perceiving 
itself as it is considered as perceived only by the subject, from outside. Also, whilst 
duration can only be adequately comprehended from within by itself, the dynamic 
object can be eventually comprehended by the subject, hence Peirce offers a more 
positive view on communication.  
Peirce’s immediate object can be correlated with an object accessed in analysis 
as Bergson understands it. Both refer to an incomplete object accessed by our con-
sciousness and /or erroneously perceived object.  However, Bergson does not con-
sider this to be a step towards an even better understanding of the object because for 
him, adequate understanding given in intuition and inadequate understanding given 
in analysis are qualitatively different phenomena and one cannot be a step leading 
towards another.  For Peirce, incomplete understanding and adequate understanding 
are phases of one and the same process, semiosis, and he accounts for degrees in 
understanding whereby our comprehension improves and leads towards its comple-
tion. Here Peirce incorporates a greater progressive dynamism in the process of 
perception and comprehension than Bergson does.  
Peirce’s immediate interpretant, the a priori knowledge of schemas and gram-
matical structures that facilitates our understanding of concrete eventualities, meta-
knowledge, would, in the Bergsonian terms be the result of our memories of previ-
ously accessed structures including motor memories that correspond to the skills of 
dealing with structures and schemas.  We can add that this sort of familiarity with 
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the object would be instinctive or intuitive, even only at the outset of the encounter 
with the object.   
 
Table 1. Peicean and Bergsonian terminology  
 
 
The dynamic interpretant more or less corresponds to Bergson’s knowledge that 
we gain in analysis. For both, this constitutes incomplete knowledge which, for 
Peirce will improve as semiotic process progresses, but not as far as Bergson is 
concerned, because no level of analytic knowledge can afford the qualitative change 
from incomplete to complete knowledge, hence Bergson does not entertain the idea 
that knowledge can be improved in the course of analysis.  
Peircean term Bergsonian term Comments 
 
The dynamic interpretant  Knowledge we gain in 
analysis.  
For both, this is in-
complete knowledge.   
The final interpretant: 
 
Intuition is adequate 
knowledge for Bergson, so 
final interpretant corres-
ponds to the final stages of 
analysis.  
Adequate knowledge, 
which for Bergson 
must be disinterested 
but has ultimate 
pragmatic value for 
Peirce. 
Signs, symbols are es-
sential for cognition. 
For Bergson, symbols and 
concepts are crystallised 
representations of reality 
which they misrepresent.  
 
For Peirce, all 
knowledge is symbo-
lic; Bergson considers 
concept free epistemo-
logy. 
Thought-signs 
 
Thoughts can be indistin-
guishable as part of hetero-
geneous duration or crystal-
lised in concepts. 
Infinite Semiosis 
 
This term corresponds to 
the Bergsnian analysis but 
could correspond to a new 
Bergsonian term of episte-
mological  duration.  
This term is central 
for engaging both 
philosophies. 
Sign-Vehicles  
(object features through 
which sign signifies) 
In Bergsonian terms, this 
would correspond to those 
sides of an object that our 
mind selects for perception.    
The term sign-vehicle 
encapsulates the rela-
tionship between the 
sign and the object, 
whilst Begson empha-
sises the subjective 
nature of perception. 
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The final interpretant is the closest Peircean term that describes ultimate, ade-
quate knowledge, but it corresponds to Bergson’s analysis, not intiution. It is also 
important to note that the final interprentant for Peirce involves a social dimension 
as “it is the interpretant we should all agree on in the long run” (Hookway, 1985, 
p.139).  Whilst Bergson dissociates adequate knowledge and communication, Peirce 
brings them together indicating that a meaning making process is essentially the 
process entailed in communication.  Their attitude towards signs and symbols is 
different: whilst both would agree that signs, symbols and concepts are essential for 
cognition, for Peirce, all knowledge is symbolic whilst Bergson considers concept 
free epistemology based on the intuitive grasp. Consequently, for Peirce all thoughts 
are signs, hence the term thought-signs, whilst Bergson would divide thoughts into 
those that are indistinguishable parts of the heterogeneous duration and those that 
have been singled out and verbalized. Infinite semiosis is the key term in Peirce that 
correlates with Bergson’s idea of duration which is an unceasing continuity and 
demonstrates that the meaning making process is a valid case of such unceasing 
continuity. 
It is important to note the philosophers’ treatment of the term sign.  The term 
sign is a key Peircean concept, a nodal structure that links and marks semiotic even-
tualities. A sign is a joint that links fragments of the semiotic process; all parties 
participating in semiosis, subject, object, and other subjects are joined together by a 
sign. Bergson would not dispute that, but whilst Peirce presents the sign as a posi-
tive, meaning making element that contributes to communicative processes, Berg-
son’s attitude towards signs is negative. “Nowhere in Bergson’s work is the 
sign/symbol as fully fleshed out” (Ardoin & Gontarski, 2013, p.55), however, for 
Bergson, analysis is primarily symbolic, and a sign is something that stabilises reali-
ty making it palatable for rational comprehension.  
Focusing on more detailed elements of the Peircean philosophy, the term sign-
vehicle referring to the features of the object through which a sign signifies, in Berg-
son, corresponds to those sides of an object that our mind selects for perception. But 
whist the Peircean sign-vehicle encapsulates the relationship between the sign and 
the object, Begson emphasises the subjective nature of perception; here both refer to 
the utilitarian, practical side of the object, the side that is relevant to the perceiver 
but differ in the attitude towards this: Bergson refutes practicality as leading towards 
the misrepresentation of reality whilst Peirce indicates that a successful practical 
engagement with an object is evidence of this object being adequately conceived. 
 
8. Semiosis as a case of duration 
A brief survey of the terms used by Peirce and Bergson reveals that although 
both philosophers develop their own lines of investigation separately from one ano-
ther they inadvertently focus on the same features and even come to the same con-
clusions, even though their evaluations of those conclusions largely differ.  We 
argue that Peirce’s theory of semiosis can be made to contribute to further develop-
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ment of Bergsonism by offering an alternative view on the process of perception and 
meaning making, which can liberate the inquirer from the constraints imposed on 
this by Bergson.  Once these constrains are lifted, it becomes evident that knowledge 
acquisition and communication are each a case duration which, using the Bergsonian 
language, prolongs the process of being. 
For Peirce, the process of semiosis is never-ending but entails within itself cer-
tain stops portrayed as the immediate interpretant, dynamic interpretant and final 
interpretant.  These interpretants reflect degrees of clarity of the meaning of the 
object which becomes “clearer” for the one who interprets the object.  Accordingly, 
each interpretant reflects the degree of clarity (understanding, one’s competence, 
one’s certainty that one’s opinion is correct) relative to the object of interpretation: 
implicit familiarity corresponds to the immediate interpretant, logical determination 
corresponds to the dynamic interpretant, and pragmatic clarification, to the final 
interpretant. 
The final interpretant is the conclusive moment determined at the end of 
interpretation, an idea that becomes the norm, the idea that determines opinions and 
human behaviour, contributes to the formation of the fabric of social and cultural 
reality. The role of the final interpretant is that this interpretation which the majority 
of participants of the communication process accept as true is a final opinion which 
emerges as the result of enquiries that are included in communication processes. The 
final (normal, eventual, or last) interpretant and the concept of dynamic object are 
closely related because, in fact, they are two aspects of the same epistemological 
process. Consequently, the final interpretant becomes a purposefully generated result 
which is not a proper sign, because it is the ultimate result of interpretation that the 
inquirer should achieve after a sufficient investigation of the sign. 
 
9. Eco: the creative process of meaning making. 
In order to account for all elements that are involved in the meaning making pro-
cess in communication, we will draw on Eco’s communication model, where com-
munication between people includes the same essential elements as the process of 
communication between mechanisms with the addition of lexical codes when it 
comes to human interactions. 
The model of the communicative process between mechanisms (and people) 
includes: a source (any really existing object, which is involved in communication); 
sender (transmitting  device that can send a signal); signal (something that is 
transmitted from a transmitter via a communication channel); channel (any device 
capable of transmitting signals); receiver (which converts the signal into a message); 
message (a set of signs); addressee (a properly configured device that is capable to 
initiate a change in the situation upon receiving a message); noise (interference 
emerging in the communication channel that may distort the physical characteristics 
of the signal), and the code. 
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In human interactions, a sender combines the information source (brain) and the 
transmitter (articulation apparatus) and a message is the system of signified elements 
i.e. the meaningful form to which the recipient has given meaning on the basis of 
some specific code. 
As far as Eco’s theory of communication is concerned, the last element, code, is 
very important as it makes communication possible by establishing a correspond-
ence between the signifier and the signified. Lexical codes contribute to various 
connotative meanings which may be shared only by some addressees whilst others 
would not understand them, so lexical codes can often play the role of noise and 
cause difficulties in communication. The code contained within a particular commu-
nication situation retains its central meaning which was indicated previously in a 
preceding communication situation. In particular communication difficulties may 
arise during the stages of receiving the message and interpreting it. 
Developing his own idea of communicative modelling, Eco claims that standard 
models of communication offered by previous information theories do not adequate-
ly describe the actual processes of communication (Eco, 2005, p. 14) because they 
neglect the complexity and diversity of communicative situations: the simultaneous 
participation of the plurality of codes and sub-codes, different sociocultural circum-
stances, etc. 
In Eco’s theory, a concrete message appears as a blank form, a formula that can 
be filled with different meanings, so the notion of meaning becomes the central 
concept in Eco’s communication model.  We can, in this context, investigate mean-
ing creation as consisting of the formation of personal meaning; coordination of 
meaning (s); creation of a common, shared meaning; creation of a jointly acceptable 
meaning. Here we also take on board Klyagin’s view of communication as interac-
tion between agents involving exchange of information and meaning taking place in 
the context of complex social systems and maintaining the sustainability and repro-
duction of those systems (Klyagin, 2007, p. 44). 
 
10. Meaning making in a dialogue: understanding and misunderstanding 
We will now analyse concrete examples of meaning making in communication 
focussing on two communication situations represented by two different dialogues 
and following the evolvement of meaning as it occurs whilst communicating parties 
pursue their own communication goals. 
In the first communication situation Anne, after failing her driving test, is telling 
her grandmother all about it.  This conversation leaves Anne frustrated but a talk 
with her friend Maria (the second communication situation) that takes place later, 
makes her feel much better.  We will focus on the dialogical exchanges entailed 
within these communication situations.  
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Dialogue 1. 
Grandmother: “Are you okay, sweetie?  You seem upset.” 
Anne:   “Granny, I failed my driving test today.”  
Grandmother:  “Oh dear.  Here you are, have a cup of tea and some cake.” 
Anne:    “It was awful! I was so nervous and kept stalling, then my 
indicator flicked off misleading other drivers, and then I near-
ly ran someone over on a pedestrian crossing.  I will never be 
able to drive!  My life is ruined forever.”  
Grandmother:  “Calm down, you’ll be alright. It’s not a big deal. Nothing 
last forever.”  
Dialogue 2. 
Maria:  “Hi, are you ok?” 
Anne:  “I failed my driving test.” 
Maria:  “Oh no. Tell me what happened.” 
Anne:  “I was so nervous to start with, and struggled to start the car. 
It kept stalling.  Then five minutes into the test my indicator 
flicked off.  The examiner said it was misleading other driv-
ers and was a major mistake.” 
Maria:  “Yeah, I failed my first test because of a really silly mistake.” 
Anne:   “And then I nearly ran someone over who was on a pedestri-
an crossing.” 
Maria:  “But you did not, that’s what matters.” 
Anne:  “I will never be able to drive!” 
Maria:   “Yes you will.  I felt the same way when I failed my test.  If 
you want we can have a practice together.” 
Anne:  “Thanks.” 
In Dailogue 1, the grandmother really responds only to the word "forever".  She 
indicates that she does not see a test failure as a problem and does not accept the 
dramatic nature of the situation, nor does she understand what this situation means 
for her granddaughter. Her words "nothing lasts forever" is not just an abstract 
phrase, as grandmother speaks here of her own experience.  This point in the dia-
logue marks the moment of misapprehension after which, if the dialogue progresses 
further, the misapprehension will escalate.  The grandmother’s phrase "nothing lasts 
forever” is a monologue about her own life, not a response to her granddaughter’s 
concerns. 
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We can see here the effect of semantic communication barriers: each communi-
cation agent acts and expresses herself according to her nature, her state of mind and 
what she expects from the conversation. The driving test failure is for Anne is not 
only a practical problem, it is a problem of her identity, which “is always linked with 
the problem of the possibility of existence of one continuous human being, combin-
ing various self-images” (Lukianova & Fell, 2015, p.523.), and being a competent 
driver is one of the self-images that are required for balancing Anne’s overall identi-
ty.  
Cultural shifts between generations affect the grandmother’s and granddaugh-
ter’s understanding of the situation at hand and interfere with their mutual under-
standing.  Studies conducted in the U.S. and Germany (which probably represent a 
wider spread of the trend) demonstrate that . 
 
[W]omen are increasingly being ascribed more masculine features, such as 
competence and dominance. At the same time, there has not been a corre-
sponding decline in ascribing them feminine features, such as empathy and 
willingness to help others (Tank & Prinzing, 2014, p. 99).  
 
The grandmother’s failure to understand Anne’s concerns stems in part from the 
difference in cultural expectations that their respective societies (that differ in time) 
have in regard to a young lady, as Tank and Prinzing’s observation suggests.  Whilst 
Anne suffers because she failed to assert herself as a competent and self-assured 
person, her grandmother whose worldview was formed in a different era is unable to 
understand Anne’s position.   
However, despite Anne’s frustration, the dialogue with her grandmother does not 
constitute a complete communication breakdown.  There is a bond between both 
women, and this bond deeply underlies their entire existence.  Even if they do not 
share the understanding of the significance of the driving test failure, they share their 
belonging to the same family; they have known each other for a long time. They are 
people with a common interest of wishing success for each other, even though they 
may differ in the understanding of what that would constitute that success.  Their 
meeting is thus not a dispensable event.  It is an event that reinforces the deeper 
layers of their communicative relation, and the grandmother offering a piece of cake 
is both practical and symbolic act of rehearsing and maintaining their special rela-
tionship.  Thus their dialogue, which includes Anne’s disappointment, creates an-
other phase in their relationship, an afternoon spent together, new reality, totally in 
accordance with Bergson’s view of duration and the evolvement of the processes of 
being which in communication amounts to the formation of new meanings. 
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The duration of communicative situation begins before the actual dialogue takes 
place.  Anne is upset and she is looking for support from the person who is her close 
family member. The grandmother, on the contrary, is relaxed, content and enjoys 
having a conversation with her granddaughter. These preconditions of the dialogue 
can be understood as implicit knowledge—the possibility of the sign to be transmit-
ted or the possibility of its existence in communications.  It is understood that the 
pure possibility of the sign to entail this readiness is  the experiencing of the sign, 
considered as the first step in the existence of the sign in the communication system, 
that is, as a minimum level of semiotic interpretation.  This is reflected in the emo-
tional state of the young woman, her mood and in the relaxed, unhurried movements 
of the grandmother: two conflicting immediate interpretants are being generated 
here.  
The immediate interpretant suggests only the possibility of the existence of the 
sign in communications, but it is important to note that the aims of interpretation are 
already being determined at this stage. As we can see, these aims are different for 
each participant as Anne seeks support, and the grandmother wants a quiet chat over 
a cup of tea. The transition from the immediate interpretant to the dynamic interpre-
tant (generating intermediate meaning) occurs virtually instantaneously here at the 
logical definitions stage, which begins at the start of the dialogue with Anne uttering 
the key phrase "I failed my driving test". 
The process of the logical definition is the transition from the internal state to the 
external expression of one’s thoughts. Anne starts talking, the grandmother replies 
and in the process of the dialogue a dynamic interpretant is generated. This is no 
longer a vague cloud of implicit meanings but some definite meaning, which partici-
pants correlate with their own prior general knowledge. This process is subjective 
and, given the disparity of the participants’ communication aims (formed at the first 
stage), we can see how misunderstanding between the grandmother and her grand-
daughter develops. The word “forever” uttered both by grandmother and grand-
daughter takes on a different meaning in their respective utterances depending on the 
significance that they attribute to it subjectively. 
Further on, in the process of pragmatic clarification the reality of the communi-
cative situation is formed and this is manifested as the final interpretant. This is the 
idea that becomes a rule which determines the communicant’s approach to his or her 
further actions. The generating of the final interpretant is the result of a communica-
tive act which, in our case constitutes two different final interpretants.  One of them, 
manifested as Anne’s dissatisfaction with the conversation with her grandmother, 
makes her turn to her friend Maria for support. 
In Dialogue 2 Anne finds the understanding she heeds. Again, the communica-
tive situation starts with events that precede the actual dialogue, at the time when the 
girls arrange to have a meeting.  Here lexical codes are fundamentally different from 
the first situation as most of the codes are shared by both participants who are young 
females of the same age group. This situation generates its own immediate interpre-
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tants and it turns out that even before the dialogue per se takes place, we can talk 
about the internal coinciding of meanings.   
In Dialogue 2 the communicating parties’ communication objectives coincide 
and this creates a unified semantic space, which contributes to the creation of other 
conditions for the formation of the dynamic interpretant. Anne’s phrase "I failed my 
driving test!" receives an emotional support from her friend. The dynamic interpre-
tant in this case appears as a single semantic field shared by both. Externally, this is 
expressed in phrases of support, emotional empathy, practical advice.  We can imag-
ine a further development of the dialogue where both friends analyse Anne’s mis-
takes that made her fail the test, thus creating further dynamic interpretants.  
Further on, in the process of creating the final interpretant, the relation between 
meaning and representamen takes the form of a fixed pattern, a new meaning is 
formed, the value of the interpretant for this situation is determined, the mode of 
actions associated with this situation is set and allows achieving the goal that was set 
by communicating parties. Anne’s friend’s offer to help with the next attempt to 
pass the test can be seen as the result of the communication process in Dialogue 2, 
the true interpretation of meaning and the genuinely creative, new element of the 
process of being in the Bergsonian terms. 
 
Conclusion 
A person enters the process of communication as a unique person, and is recog-
nised by another person—a partner in dialogue—also as a unique person. Whilst 
conducting a dialogue, we act as if we read the other person, and the extent of the 
success of that reading regulates the process of communication, as the measure of 
accuracy of the reading of another person determines the success of communication. 
The course of getting to know another person several processes take place: the 
emotional evaluation of our interlocutor, an attempt to understand the structure of 
his or her actions, working out our own strategy aimed at changing our own behav-
iour in accordance with the other person’s actions. 
Eco stresses the difference between denoting, (denotare) and signifying (signifi-
care)—between denotation and meaning, that is, between a reference to something 
and signifying something (Eco, 2005, p. 307).  Thus two types of analysis of a 
communicative act are possible here: the analysis of the formation of denotative 
values (Eco) and analysis of the sequence of the creation of meanings (Peirce). 
The first process accounts for the following elements: 
The specificity of the intellect of those who communicate; 
Unequal knowledge of the subject of conversation (for a young lady, a driver's 
license is an integral part of life nowadays); 
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Different lexicon and thesaurus (experience of a grandmother, the minimalism of 
youth); 
Lack of a common understanding of the communication (the significance of ob-
taining a driving license for further life, the importance of it for a social status and so 
on.) 
Cultural and age differences, etc. (Maturity and young age in Dialogue 1). 
These elements have a direct impact on the process of creating new meanings 
that, according to Peirce’s theory of degrees of clarity, appear as a sequence of 
meanings progressively emerging in communication situations. These new meanings 
are intermediate results of some communication, interpretants. The interpretant is an 
effect made on the perceiver by the sign, something that is being made in the mind 
of the interpreter, so interpretant can equated with meaning.  
The first degree of clarity is implicit knowledge, which corresponds to the 
immediate interpretant. This is a type of transmitting signs into some stable 
transferability, which indicates a potentiality, ability. The second degree of clarity is 
a logical definition corresponding to the dynamic interpretant as any consequence, 
actually produced by the sign per se. The third degree of clarity, pragmatic 
clarification, corresponds to the final interpretant. In practice, this result translates 
into the influence that the sign produces on the communication partner. 
The above analysis demonstrates that Peirce’s theory of symbiosis can resolve 
the Bergsonian communication problem and that it can also contribute to the further 
development of Bergsonism as a theory that explores the dynamic nature of 
phenomena.  Instead of seeking communication which would be the duplication of 
some one else’s conscious life in our own, we can suggest a view of communication 
which entails creation of new meanings and inspirations. 
Note 
This paper has addressed the current volume’s theme, Symbolic Communication, 
in the following way: The authors initiated a philosophical study of ways in which 
symbols, broadly conceived, either impede or facilitate genuine, fulfilling communi-
cation between people. Whilst creating an unlikely, yet successful, dialogue between 
Bergson and Peirce, the authors searched beneath the surface of a mere transmission 
of meanings via concepts and words, in an attempt to uncover deeper layers of 
shared meanings that underpin conceptual exchanges. 
This study was supported by The Tomsk State University Academic D.I. Mende-
leev Fund Program in 2015.  Prof. Natalia Lukianova took part in this study in 2015. 
This study was completed as part of the research project “Youth’s Portrait” of 
the Future: Methodology of Investigating Representations” funded by the Russian 
Humanitarian Scientific Fund. Grant Number 15-03-00812a. Prof. Natalia Lukiano-
va and Dr Elena Fell took part in this study. 
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